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Abstract
We propose an entanglement-based quantum bit string commitment protocol whose composability is
proven in the random oracle model. This protocol has the additional property of preserving the privacy
of the committed message. Even though this property is not resilient against man-in-the-middle attacks,
this threat can be circumvented by considering that the parties communicate through an authenticated
channel. The protocol remains secure (but not private) if we realize the random oracles as physical
unclonable functions in the so-called bad PUF model with access before the opening phase.
1 Introduction
One of the most basic building blocks of complex cryptosystems is commitment schemes. A commitment
scheme is a protocol that allows two mistrustful parties to interact in order to communicate some information
that is set up a priori by the sender and that the receiver can only unveil at a later stage. In other words,
it is just as if the message was sent inside a locked box, which can only be opened after the sender hands
the key over to the receiver. The protocol is secure if the receiver cannot learn the message before the
sender wishes to unveil it, and the sender cannot change the message after committing to it. Commitment
schemes are used in several protocols, such as coin flipping, zero-knowledge proofs, and secure multiparty
computation [Blu83, BCC88, DFL+09, ALP+14]. Since any weakness in the building blocks affects the
security of the overall system, it is important to ensure that they are highly reliable.
Unfortunately, classical bit commitment (BC) schemes cannot be simultaneously unconditionally secure
against a corrupted sender and a corrupted receiver, and Canetti and Fischlin proved that universally com-
posable BC is impossible in the plain model [CF01]. In 1996, Lo and Chau [LC97] and independently May-
ers [May96] proved a no-go theorem for unconditionally secure quantum BC in the standard non-relativistic
quantum cryptographic framework. Since then, many protocols relying on additional assumptions have been
presented. Although secure commitment schemes can be obtained through the exploitation of relativistic
constraints, these types of protocols are challenging to implement.
In this paper, we propose a new private commitment protocol, i.e., a commitment where the message is
never announced, nor can be derived from the messages exchanged between the parties. This property is
attained through the use of entanglement. Since commitment protocols are mostly used as cryptographic
primitives, it is of the utmost importance to study their security in different computational environments.
As such, a strong emphasis is placed on the composability of these protocols. After characterizing the
commitment functionality, the EPR pair trusted source functionality and the random oracle functionality
in Section 2, we show in Section 3 that these last two functionalities can be used as a resource to achieve
a private commitment protocol with composable security, which is proven in Section 4. In Section 5, we
analyse the security of the protocol in the bad PUF attack model. Section 6 features our final conclusions
alongside with some directions for future work.
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2 Preliminaries
A bit commitment protocol starts with the commitment phase, during which Alice chooses the value m she
wants to commit to, and generates the pair (c, d). c is the commitment, which she immediately sends to Bob
(who outputs a receipt message), and d is the decommitment, which she keeps to herself. In the opening
phase, Alice sends (b, d) to Bob, who can either accept or reject. The protocol is said to be concealing if Bob
cannot learn Alice’s committed message m before the opening phase, and binding if Alice cannot change her
committed message m after the commitment phase.
The security of commitment protocols can be studied from a stand-alone perspective, with the require-
ments of concealingness and bindingness. However, since commitments are generally used as a subroutine of
more complex tasks, it becomes mandatory for protocols to be secure in any computational environment. In
a composable security proof, the parties running the protocol are considered as a single big party which must
be indistinguishable from a simulated machine running an ideal functionality for commitment (see Figure 1).
Functionality FCOM
Parameters:
• Parties: Alice and Bob.
• Commitment size: k (for bit commitment, k = 1).
1. Upon receiving a commitment b ∈ {0, 1}k from Alice, it records b and sends a receipt to Bob.
Subsequent committed messages are ignored.
2. Upon receiving the message ‘open’ from Alice, it proceeds as follows: If a message b is recorded, then
send b to Bob. Otherwise, halt.
Figure 1: Commitment functionality.
In the protocol described in the next section, we assume that the parties have access to two different
resources. The first one is an EPR pair trusted source modelled by the functionality in Figure 2. Note
that the existence of this source is a very reasonable assumption since entanglement distribution has already
been successfully implemented [WJS+19, YCL+17]. Before the beginning of the protocol, Alice and Bob can
additionally sacrifice a small number of entangled pairs to estimate their correlation by using an algorithm
such as the one described in Section 6.2 of [Ren05]. Even if noisy quantum channels result in a loss of entan-
glement, the parties can run an entanglement distillation protocol and transform non-maximally entangled
shared pairs into a smaller number of maximally entangled ones by using only local operations and classical
communication (e.g. [BBP+96] and [PSBZ01] — the last one is significantly less effective than the first, but
has the advantage of being within the reach of current technology).
Functionality FEPR
Parameters:
• Parties: Alice and Bob.
1. Upon receiving a value n as input from one of the parties, it generates n EPR pairs |Ψ00〉 and sends
the first qubit of each pair to Alice and the second one to Bob.
Figure 2: EPR pair source functionality.
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The second required resource, described by the functionality FRO in Figure 3, is named random oracle
and behaves as an ideal cryptographic hash function, i.e., it maps each query to a fixed and uniformly random
output in its range.
Functionality FRO
Parameters:
• List L, initially empty.
• Range {0, 1}k.
1. Upon receiving a query q, it checks whether there is a pair (q, h) ∈ L. If so, it returns h.
2. If there is no pair (q, h) ∈ L, it chooses h ∈ {0, 1}k, stores the pair (q, h) ∈ L and returns h.
Figure 3: Random oracle functionality.
It is essential in our proof that a quantum computer cannot call the random oracle in superposition.
Therefore a realizable random oracle implementation cannot be a cryptographic hash function such as SHA.
This fact makes the random oracle quite a strong assumption; nevertheless, it can be realized using physical
unclonable functions (PUFs). PUFs are physical systems with some microscale structural disorder, which is
assumed to be unique to each PUF and unclonable even by the PUF manufacturer. When external stimuli
(challenges) are applied to a PUF, its response will depend on the disorder of the device. Therefore, each
PUF P implements a unique function fP that gives responses r = fP (c) to challenges c. For more about
PUFs we refer to [RSS09] and [vDR12]. PUFs have a classical interface, and cannot be run in superposition,
even by an all-powerful quantum adversary.
3 The Proposed Protocol
Protocol 1 Private Quantum Bit String Commitment
Message to be shared: m = m1...m2n.
Setup: Alice chooses a message size 2n and sends the value n to FEPR. The functionality prepares the
state |ψ〉 = ⊗n
i=1
|Ψ00〉 and sends the odd qubits to Alice and the even ones to Bob.
Commitment phase:
1. To commit to a message m, Alice generates an uniformly random basis string b ∈
{{|0〉, |1〉}, {|+〉, |−〉}}n, where |+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
and |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
, and measures each of her qubits i
in the basis bi, obtaining outcomes O ∈ {0, 1}n. She then sends Bob the strings c1 = m⊕H1(b|O) and
c2 = H2(b), where b|O is the concatenation of b and O.
Opening phase:
2. Alice sends the bases b to Bob.
3. If H2(b) = c2, Bob accepts the opening, measures each of his qubits i in the basis bi, obtaining outcomes
O ∈ {0, 1}n, and calculates m = c1 ⊕ H1(b|O). Otherwise, he rejects.
3
One of the characteristics of FCOM , the functionality for commitments, is that the message is never
publicly announced. In most of the existing commitment protocols, nonetheless, the opening step includes
sending the message over a public channel. Here we propose a protocol (Protocol 1) that is not only
composable but also preserves the privacy of the message. We note that the privacy property is vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks: a third party, Eve, can pretend to be the EPR pair trusted source and send
different sets of EPR pairs to Alice and Bob and then forward any received message. This can be prevented
by adding an authenticated channel between Alice and Bob, as similarly done in quantum key distribution
protocols.
The protocol will use as a resource the EPR pair trusted source functionality (Figure 2) and the random
oracle functionality (Figure 3) presented in the previous section. It needs two instances of FRO: H1 with
range {0, 1}2n and H2 with range {0, 1}n. Note that, unfortunately, we cannot use the weaker version of the
ROM, the global ROM [CJS14], since the programmability of the oracle is a key point of our security proof.
4 Security Analysis
We proceed now to prove the security of Protocol 1 in the Abstract Cryptography framework [MR11]
instantiated with quantum Turing machines [MSS15]. The equivalences that need to be satisfied are depicted
in Figure 4.
FCOM
≈
FEPR
FRO
piA piB
(a) Soundness.
FCOM σB
≈
FEPR
FRO
piA
(b) Concealing.
FCOMσA
≈
FEPR
FRO
piB
(c) Binding.
Figure 4: Conditions for the constructability of the resource FCOM from the resources FEPR and FRO. Diagram (a) corresponds
to the soundness property by showing the equivalence between the ideal commitment functionality FCOM and the protocol
for honest parties (Alice and Bob behave according to piA and piB , respectively). Diagrams (b) and (c) correspond to security
against dishonest Bob and Alice, respectively. Since the algorithm they follow is unknown, piA and piB are removed from the
respective real system, while the simulators σA and σB are respectively added to the ideal system.
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 constructs from FEPR and FRO a resource that is within a negligible distance from
the resource FCOM for simulators and distinguishers modelled as quantum Turing machines.
Proof. This proof will be divided into three parts, one for each of the required equivalences.
Soundness
Let |ψ〉 be the overall state of the system after Step 1. Note that
|Ψ00〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉),
so when Alice measures each of her qubits, the corresponding EPR pair will collapse to either |00〉 or |11〉
(for bi = {|0〉, |1〉}), or to either | + +〉 or | − −〉 (for bi = {|+〉, |−〉}). Therefore, when Bob measures each
of his qubits i in the basis b′i = bi he received from Alice in the opening phase, he will get exactly the
same outcome as Alice, O′
i
= Oi, implying that H1(b
′|O′) = H1(b|O). Bob will then retrieve the message
successfully, since c1 ⊕ H1(b′|O′) = m⊕ H1(b|O)⊕ H1(b′|O′) = m.
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Concealingness
Given any behaviour of a dishonest receiver, we have to construct a simulator σB that simulates H1, H2,
and FEPR and provides the receiver with a commitment that can later be opened to the message in FCOM .
Consider the following program for σB:
• Simulation of H1: Whenever σB receives the query b|O to H1, it answers with h = m⊕ c1. In all other
cases it returns a value h as the ideal functionality would do and keeps (q, h) on a list of queries and
respective answers.
• Simulation of H2: Whenever σB receives queries q to H2, it returns a value h as the ideal functionality
would do and keeps (q, h) on a list of queries and respective answers.
• Simulation of FEPR: During the setup phase, σB generates the state |ψ〉 =
⊗n
i=1
|Ψ00〉, sends the
even qubits to the corrupted receiver and keeps the odd ones to itself.
• During the commitment phase, upon receiving the receipt from FCOM , σB chooses two uniformly
random strings, c1 ∈ {0, 1}2n and b ∈ {{|0〉, |1〉}, {|+〉, |−〉}}n, and measures each of its qubits i in the
basis bi, obtaining outcomes O ∈ {0, 1}n. It then sends c1 and c2 = H2(b) to the corrupted receiver.
• During the opening phase, upon receiving the message m from FCOM , σB sends the bases b to the
corrupted receiver.
The behaviour of σB is the same regardless of the message that was sent to FCOM , and hence there is no
algorithm for the dishonest receiver allowing him to guess the committed message with probability greater
than 1/22n.
Bindingness
Given any behaviour of a dishonest sender, we have to construct a simulator σA that simulates H1, H2,
and FEPR and retrieves the message m from the sender’s commitment values and sends it to FCOM . It
must also be able to detect when the sender is cheating and, whenever that happens, not send the opening
message to FCOM . Consider the following program for σA:
• Simulation of H1 and H2: Whenever σA receives queries q to H1 or H2, it returns a value h as the ideal
functionality would do and keeps (q, h) on a list of queries and respective answers.
• Simulation of FEPR: During the setup phase, σA generates the state |ψ〉 =
⊗n
i=1
|Ψ00〉, sends the odd
qubits to the corrupted sender and keeps the even ones to itself.
• During the commitment phase, upon receiving the commitment strings c1 and c2 from the corrupted
sender, σA sends m = c1 ⊕ H1(b|O) to FCOM .
• During the opening phase, upon receiving the basis string b′ from the corrupted sender, σA sends the
message ‘open’ to FCOM if b′ = b. Otherwise, it does not open the commitment.
The real world receiver outputs error whenever the string b′ sent by the sender is such that H2(b
′) 6= H2(b).
From the soundness property, we know that when b′ = b the receiver correctly retrieves the message. We are
interested in the situation where b′ 6= b (in which case the commitment will not be opened in the ideal world)
and H2(b
′) = H2(b). Since FRO is collision-resistant, this can only happen with negligible probability.
The addition of an authenticated communication channel makes this protocol a private and composable
commitment protocol, which is yet to be achieved by classical cryptography based on the same assumptions.
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5 Analysis in the Realistic Bad PUF Model
In order to study the security of PUF applications in a realistic scenario, two attack models are described in
[Rv13]: the PUF re-use model and the bad PUF model. In the PUF re-use model, we assume some PUFs
are used more than once throughout the protocol and the adversary has access to the PUFs more than once.
In the bad PUF model, the fact that PUFs are real physical objects is exploited, and we consider both
the simulatable bad PUFs, which possess a simulation algorithm that can be used by the manufacturer to
compute responses to challenges and the challenge-logging bad PUFs, which allow the manufacturer to access
a memory module in the device and read all the challenges applied to it (this malicious feature could also
be added by an adversary after the construction of the PUF). The notion of strong PUFs is also described.
Strong PUF is a type of PUF with a public interface (i.e., anyone holding it can apply challenges and read
the responses), a large number of possible challenges and behaviour so complex that it cannot be modelled
to predict responses to challenges. In our brief analysis, we consider that in the proposed protocol (Protocol
1) the ROM is replaced by strong PUFs.
Note that Protocol 1 is secure in the bad PUF model if we also consider that Alice sends the message
m to Bob in the opening phase, thus giving up the privacy property. The security holds independently of
whether the malicious party has access to the PUFs before the opening phase or not. This follows from the
fact that considering the PUFs are manufactured by Alice and she can find collisions in H1 and H2, she will
still not know what message to open to in order to match the one calculated by Bob since the outcomes of
his measurements of qubits in incorrect bases will be uniformly random.
6 Conclusions
With this work, we achieved a commitment protocol that is not only composable but also private, since the
message is never publicly announced. Man-in-the-middle attacks can be prevented by adding an authenti-
cated channel. We suggest the use of physical unclonable functions to model random oracles, and note that
the protocol remains secure (although not private) if we consider the bad PUF attack model with access
before the opening phase, which has been proven impossible for classical bit commitment without other
assumptions.
Additionally, it is also of interest to further study how to obtain composability in commitment schemes
while using the minimum possible assumptions (for more on this topic see [LYM+19]), and which of these
assumptions are needed to achieve privacy.
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